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The newly elected Labour government has pledged to ‘reinvigorate the Private Finance Initiative’,
as part of the new emphasis on ‘public/private partnerships’ in the delivery of core public services.
This article assesses the merits of using private finance to deliver public services against three
criteria: whether it will lead to additional investment in social infrastructure, whether it represents
good value for the taxpayer’s money and whether the use of private finance will reduce the public
sector’s flexibility to pursue its public service objectives.
JEL classification: H54, H11.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, governments world-wide have sought to increase the
involvement of the private sector in the delivery of public services. These
initiatives have taken many forms such as outright privatisation of previously
state-owned industries, contracting out of services such as refuse collection or
cleaning to private firms, and the use of private finance in the provision of social
infrastructure. Privatisation has occurred in over 100 countries, most notably in
the former Communist countries of central and eastern Europe. Contracting out
of labour-intensive services has also been widespread.
1 Concessions to build and
operate large-scale infrastructure networks such as roads have been of particular
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interest to rapidly developing countries in South America and South-East Asia
(Desai and Brooks, 1997).
Within the UK, interest in introducing ‘private capital and expertise in to the
provision of public infrastructure’
2 appears to have survived last year’s general
election, with the Labour Party’s election manifesto pledging to ‘reinvigorate the
Private Finance Initiative’ (PFI). Once in office, the government-commissioned
Bates Review recommended 29 legislative and procedural changes intended ‘to
identify any obstacles in the way of bringing PFI projects to fruition’.
3 More
recently, the terms of reference for the Comprehensive Spending Review called
for departments to examine the scope for greater use of public–private
partnerships in the delivery of public services. This paper provides a preliminary
assessment of the effects on social welfare of using private finance in the
delivery of public services on the basis of three criteria:
•  Additionality. Does the PFI allow the creation of additional social
infrastructure?
•  Value for money. Does the PFI provide value for money?
•  Public objectives. Does the use of private finance reduce the public sector’s
flexibility to pursue its public service objectives?
Section II traces the development of the Private Finance Initiative in the UK.
Section III considers whether the PFI is likely to result in the provision of more
social infrastructure than would have gone ahead under traditional procurement
routes. Section IV looks at the arguments and initial evidence on whether the PFI
is likely to prove good value for taxpayers’ money. Section V assesses the
impact of using private finance on the public sector’s ability to deliver its public
service objectives. Section VI concludes.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVATE FINANCE INITIATIVE
The launch of the PFI in the UK marks a dramatic shift from the general
presumption against the use of private finance in social infrastructure projects
which had previously existed in the UK. This presumption against private
finance was embodied in the Treasury’s Ryrie rules which operated during the
1980s. These rules insisted that privately financed projects could only proceed if
they offered better value for money than a hypothetical public sector
‘comparator’, even if budget constraints meant that the public sector alternative
would not go ahead. As Willetts (1993) argued, ‘the notorious Ryrie rules were a
tease — the conditions they set for privately financed projects were never likely
to be met in practice’.
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The Ryrie rules were relaxed in two stages (in 1989 and 1992) so that a
public sector comparator would no longer be required if either the project could
be financed through user charges or there was no reasonable possibility of the
project going ahead within the public sector (Heald and Geaughan, 1995; HM
Treasury, 1992).
4 HM Treasury (1993) distinguished three types of PFI project:
•  Financially free-standing projects where the outlay can be recouped through
user charges such as the Skye Bridge.
•  Joint ventures where the public sector provides the PFI contractor with a
subsidy to reflect the social benefits of a project not reflected in cash flow,
such as the Docklands Light Railway extension to Lewisham, the Manchester
Metrolink and the Channel Tunnel Rail Link.
•  Services sold to the public sector such as those provided by Bridgend Prison,
Design, Build, Finance and Operate (DBFO) road schemes and new trains for
London Underground’s Northern Line.
Under traditional procurement practices, the construction of publicly owned
assets such as roads or prisons is typically undertaken to detailed specifications
by private contractors following a competitive tender. Once completed, the
public sector is responsible for providing public services using publicly owned
infrastructure. Under PFI service contracts, the public sector purchases services
such as the availability of prison places or office accommodation from the
private sector which owns and manages the underlying infrastructure. This
affects how public services are financed and delivered but not who ultimately
pays for them. Instead of capital spending having a one-off impact on the public
accounts when the investment occurs, there is a stream of future revenue
commitments over the lifetime of the service contract, pushing the date at which
capital investment scores against public spending totals and the public sector
borrowing requirement (PSBR) into the future. Even when a private contractor
recoups its costs via user charges, such as with the Skye Bridge or the Second
Severn Crossing, this represents income that would otherwise have accrued to
the state.
Despite some concern over delays in the process of tendering and signing PFI
contracts (Treasury Select Committee, 1996), deals with a capital value of over
£7.5 billion had been signed by November 1997.
5 Whilst the fact that PFI deals
are actually going ahead is welcome evidence that the initial hurdles involved in
getting the PFI off the ground are being overcome, the value of contracts signed
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is at best a partial measure of policy success. In the following sections, we
present a broader assessment of the merits of the PFI based on whether desirable
projects would not have gone ahead in the absence of the PFI and whether the
use of private finance represents value for money for the taxpayer or a suitable
basis for realising public service objectives.
III. HAS THE PFI LED TO ADDITIONAL INVESTMENT IN SOCIAL
INFRASTRUCTURE?
During the early stages of developing the PFI, the Treasury implied that the PFI
would allow additional investment in social infrastructure compared with what
would be possible using conventional public finance alone. The November 1994
Financial Statement and Budget Report stated that the ‘private sector’s
contribution is additional to public provision. This means that, for a given
amount of public expenditure, new and better quality capital investment will be
secured by the nation’. For the use of private finance to allow desirable
additional investment in social infrastructure implies that there is some artificial
constraint on public sector borrowing which would otherwise prevent investment
in social infrastructure with positive net benefits from proceeding. This appears
to depend on an argument that the public investment programme is constrained
because it scores against the current year’s PSBR, used by many commentators
as an indicator of the government’s fiscal competence, whilst PFI spending is not
constrained in the same way because it involves a string of (perhaps uncertain)
commitments which will affect the PSBR at some stage in the future. In such a
case, additional investment might enhance social welfare, whether or not private
finance were more efficient.
Of course, if the public and private sectors are equally efficient, the present
discounted value of the government’s liabilities should be the same under
traditional procurement and under the PFI. Therefore, if the PSBR is seen as a
useful measure of the government’s impact on the macroeconomy, then attempts
to get around the precise definition of the PSBR will simply distort its usefulness
as a measure or lead to the measure being redefined to include all ‘government-
sponsored capital investment’. In any case, central government departments plan
to produce budgets using resource accounting methods by April 1999 (HM
Treasury, 1995a). Rather than public sector investment scoring against public
spending totals in the year the investment occurs, it will be depreciated over the
lifetime of the asset in a similar fashion to PFI spending, reducing any incentives
for public sector managers to choose PFI rather than traditional procurement for
reasons other than value for money.
Since the use of private finance pushes forward the time when capital
investment scores against public expenditure, there is a danger that public sector
managers used to the traditional three-year public expenditure planning horizonPrivate Opportunity, Public Benefit?
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might pay insufficient attention to the growth of contractual commitments in the
future.
6 The Treasury decision to publish information on such future
commitments alongside the Budget documentation is to be welcomed in this
respect. In practice, however, the planned expansion of the PFI in recent years
has been accompanied, in successive Budgets, by cuts to the public sector capital
programme, suggesting that private finance has been used as a substitute for
rather than as an addition to public sector investment.
Table 1 shows that, since the November 1994 Budget, public sector
investment plans for 1997–98 have been cut three times — by £2 billion in
November 1995 (representing a 9 per cent cut), £1.8 billion in November 1996
(9 per cent) and £1 billion in March 1998 (5.5 per cent).
7 In the November 1995
Budget, planned spending of £2.6 billion under the PFI more than compensated
for reductions in public sector investment, leaving total publicly sponsored
investment £0.6 billion higher overall. However, subsequent reductions in public
sector investment plans, combined with delays in taking PFI projects forward,
have resulted in an estimated out-turn for total publicly sponsored investment in
1997–98 that is some £3.3 billion lower than originally planned within the public
sector alone. Forecasts of publicly sponsored investment for 1996–97 and 1998–
99 have evolved in a similar manner.
Far from generating additional investment, this evidence might be taken to
suggest that PFI spending has not even compensated for cuts to public spending
plans. We cannot draw any definite inferences from such evidence since we
cannot determine whether public sector capital investment plans would have
been cut even in the absence of the PFI. Since it is often politically more
expedient to delay capital projects than to rein in current spending in times of
fiscal restraint, capital budgets have traditionally been targeted (Sentance, Hall
and O’Sullivan, 1998).
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TABLE 1
Forecast Publicly Sponsored Capital Expenditure for 1997–98
£ billion
Nov. 1994 Nov. 1995 Nov. 1996 March 1998
Public sector investment 21.8 19.8 18.0 17.0
PFI investment *** 2.6 2.5 1.5
Publicly sponsored investment 21.8 22.4 20.5 18.5Fiscal Studies
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Even if the existence of the PFI had driven the cuts to public budgets in
recent years, this is compatible with a strategy of overcoming institutional inertia
by placing more pressure on public sector managers to give serious consideration
to the use of private finance. This does not necessarily mean that PFI spending
will not be ‘additional’ in the longer run since such incentives may no longer be
required once the initiative has developed.
In other cases, the observed shortfall between forecast and realised levels of
PFI expenditure to date may reflect one-off delays associated with developing a
new method of public procurement or the need for legislative reform.
8 The third
PFI prison contract was let six months after the invitation to tender was issued,
roughly 65 per cent more quickly than the first two deals (National Audit Office,
1997c). In health-care and local authority services, legislative clarification of the
powers of NHS Trusts and local authorities to enter into PFI contracts was
required. This might mean that concerns over delays to investment as a result of
using the PFI may soon be of mainly historical interest.
IV. DOES THE PFI REPRESENT GOOD VALUE FOR MONEY?
This section considers whether the use of private finance is likely to provide
value for money in the delivery of public services. One reason for expecting
public finance to provide better value is that governments, as large-scale low-risk
borrowers, can usually borrow money more cheaply than private sector bodies.
Of course, the government borrowing rate does not reflect the risks of individual
projects whereas private borrowing rates may do, and it would be wrong to
discriminate against private financing because it made explicit costs that, with
public financing, are hidden but no less real. However, it is reasonable to expect
that costs of uncertainty around the expected return from the project will be
greater when they are concentrated on the providers of private finance. The loan
stock for the Skye Bridge had a 2 per cent risk margin over comparable gilts.
9
The use of the PFI will incur additional financing costs due to the need for some
element of equity finance. The projected real rates of return on equity invested in
the Fazakerley and Bridgend prison contracts were 12.8 per cent and 19.4 per
cent respectively. Whilst the use of private finance on the Skye Bridge led to £4
million additional financing costs compared with the 6 per cent real cost of
capital used by the public sector, 73 per cent of this represents the return to the
providers of equity capital.
10
Value for money in PFI schemes depends on any gains in efficiency through
private sector involvement more than compensating for higher finance costs
                                                                                                                                   
8The National Audit Office (1997b) found that using the PFI route delayed progress on the contract for a
replacement National Insurance recording system (NIRS2) by six months.
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(Heald, 1997). It is difficult to obtain clear evidence on this, since many PFI
projects are large-scale one-off projects for which it is very difficult to calculate
an accurate and uncontroversial public sector comparator. Given the paucity of
reliable empirical evidence available at present, we examine three arguments that
have been advanced to suggest that the use of private finance can indeed
represent value for money. First, the private sector might be inherently more
efficient or more innovative than the public sector. Second, private finance might
extend competitive pressures to more of the processes involved in the delivery of
public services. Third, the private sector may be able to manage some types of
risks more effectively than the public sector. We examine each of these
arguments in turn.
1. Public versus Private Provision
Whilst capital market disciplines and different managerial incentive structures
are often claimed to make the private sector inherently more efficient than the
public sector, there is little empirical evidence to support this view (Kay, 1993)
since there are relatively few examples of public and private firms competing
against each other in the same markets and under the same competitive
pressures. Recent experience in contracting out refuse collection services in the
UK did, however, suggest that public sector organisations winning contracts
achieved less than half the cost reductions made by private firms (Szymanski,
1996).
Public sector managers may not face incentives to take risks through
innovation (Dixit, 1997). This is one reason why third-party income (revenue
from users of the asset in addition to the government) may be an important
source of value for money on PFI contracts where spare capacity is created. The
provision of computer systems for the National Insurance system (NIRS2) was
found by a recent National Audit Office report (1997a) to represent ‘strikingly
good value provided the service contracted for is delivered’. The contractor, who
retained intellectual property rights to the system, made a final bid well below
the level of its original bid since it hoped to spread the substantial fixed costs of
the project by making further sales to other organisations. The generation of
additional receipts through more intensive exploitation of assets in this way may
allow lower costs for other public sector programmes such as school sports
facilities.
2. The Role of Competition
Even if private firms are not inherently more efficient than public sector
organisations, PFI could bring efficiency gains by exposing more of the stages
involved in the delivery of public services to the process of competition. Under
traditional public procurement, private sector firms competed in how to deliver
detailed project specifications at lowest cost. Under the PFI, private firmsFiscal Studies
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compete to provide specified services to the public sector, being left free to
innovate in project design, the balance between construction and maintenance
costs and the transfer of risks from the public sector. This is not the traditional
notion of competition within the market, of course, since many public services
have a significant monopoly component, but rather a process of competition for
the market (Chadwick, 1859). Baumol, Bailey and Willig (1982) argue that the
process of competition for a market could still deliver welfare gains for society
as a whole, even if there were no process of competition within the market.
Limited availability of data and non-homogeneous contracts have resulted in few
empirical studies of this issue, other than for refuse collection.
11 Szymanski
(1996) found that the introduction of compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) in
refuse collection in the UK in the late 1980s had led to average savings in net
spending of 18 per cent, even though 75 per cent of the contracts were awarded
to public sector organisations. In each case, cost reductions appeared to be linked
to changing the input mix and reducing wage costs towards market levels.
Value-for-money gains depend on the existence of a competitive bidding
process. Gómez-Lobo and Szymanski (1997) found that a higher number of bids
in the process of contracting out local authority refuse services was associated
with a lower cost of service. The National Audit Office (1997b) has therefore
expressed concern that some important financing costs in the Skye Bridge
contract were determined through negotiation with the preferred bidder rather
than through competition.
The number of consortia interested in large-scale PFI contracts is likely to be
influenced by the likelihood of incurring significant bidding costs, varying from
£0.5 million to £2.5 million in the NIRS2 contract, for example (National Audit
Office, 1997b). The deterrent effect of these costs will be greater if there is any
uncertainty over whether departments will take projects forward through the PFI,
leading to the Bates Review recommendation for departments to ‘road-test’
projects for commercial viability before issuing formal invitations to tender. One
feature of contract design that is likely to influence the number of potential
bidders, as well as the amount of risk that private bidders are willing to bear, is
the liquidity of their investment. The public sector needs to achieve an
appropriate balance between allowing the transfer of equity stakes and the
importance of having a clearly defined private sector partner. This is particularly
important for public–private partnerships or where the public sector provides
either upfront subsidy or assets such as land with development potential as part
of the deal (HM Treasury, 1996a). Whilst too few bidders in large-scale capital
projects may lead to insufficient competition, inviting too many firms to submit
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formal bids may reduce effective competition due to the lower probability of
each bidder winning the contract.
3. Risk Transfer
A central issue in PFI is a more efficient allocation of risk between the public
and private sectors (HM Treasury, 1995b). This is not simply a question of how
much risk is transferred but what types of risk are transferred, since the private
sector will only be able to reduce the cost of risk if firms can either reduce the
overall level of risk or manage those risks more effectively. This is explicitly
recognised in the HM Prison Service study (1996) of the first two Design,
Construct, Manage and Finance (DCMF) prison contracts, in which it was felt
that ‘the proposed allocation of risk to be transferred under the DCMF package
maximises the chance that such risks do not materialise’ (italics added).
The allocation of risks and incentives faced by the private sector in PFI
projects is largely determined by the choice of payment mechanism under the
PFI contract. Long-term service contracts based on service availability, such as
the DCMF prison contracts or the DBFO road contracts, encourage private firms
to minimise the ‘lifetime costs’ of projects by balancing higher construction
costs against lower maintenance costs in the future. Payment mechanisms that
are not triggered until a service is being supplied, such as the NIRS2 contract,
provide strong incentives to avoid delays in design and construction, especially
where the contract termination date is independent of when service delivery
actually commences.
12 Similarly, payment mechanisms based on the availability
of prison cells or Underground trains give incentives for adequate maintenance.
The potential for efficiency gains may be considerable, especially where
construction risks, which have sometimes led to large cost overruns under
traditional public procurement, can be reduced or simply better managed by the
private sector. HM Prison Service (1996) reports that out-turn costs averaged 18
per cent higher than tender price under traditional procurement.
In principle, the gains resulting from minimising ‘lifetime costs’ rather than
construction costs could be realised within the public sector. Public sector
managers faced with pressures to control annual departmental budgets may be
tempted to economise on short-term construction costs, and construction
companies may face few incentives to look for design or construction changes
that would give long-term economies. The introduction of resource accounting
will improve these incentives, at least for public sector managers, but only to the
extent that it is annual resource costs rather than cash costs that limit their
spending.
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The degree of price and cost indexation built into service contracts will be
more important to the overall allocation of risk in contracts where
complementary inputs are purchased alongside the core service. In the Skye
Bridge contract, where complementary inputs are negligible, the real value of
total payments is fixed, effectively transferring all cost risks to the private
sector.
13 For prison contracts, by contrast, cleaning, catering and security
services are packaged together with the core service of cell availability. In such
cases, periodic pricing reviews or the specification of circumstances that can
trigger price revisions, such as changes in costs outside the contractor’s control,
may need to be written into contracts. In the DCMF prison contracts, provisions
allow both parties to demand a variation in the price of services if there is a
change in the consortium’s costs outside its control. Price variations should
always be related to published price indices which reflect input costs but are
outside the control of the contractor concerned.
Whilst a more efficient allocation of risk between the public and private
sectors carries considerable scope for improving value for money in public
service provision, the precise allocation of risk is a complex and difficult
process. Poor value for money is likely to result from the transfer of either too
little risk to the private sector (which may dull efficiency incentives) or too much
risk or the wrong types of risk, leading to higher costs. The latter may occur
where the private sector is asked to bear risks that it cannot control, such as
volume risk and some types of residual value risk. There is also a question of
whether transfers of risk to the private sector will turn out to be more apparent
than real. We consider each of these issues below.
(a) Volume Risk
Transferring risks associated with public policy decisions, such as the public
sector’s demand for a service, over which a private contractor has little control,
is more akin to the public sector purchasing an insurance contract. This is
unlikely to be a cost-effective strategy. There should be cause for concern where
the principal payment mechanism under PFI contracts is related to volume of
usage rather than availability of a service, since the former is largely outside the
control of the private operator.
PFI deals signed to date have experimented with alternative allocations of
volume risk. In the tenders for the first two DCMF prison contracts, private firms
were unwilling to accept volume risks associated with sentencing policies, which
were seen as outside their control. In the Skye Bridge contract, which is similar
to the Least Present Value Auctions proposed by Engel, Fischer and Galetovic
(1997), the contract length is variable, ending when a predetermined volume of
toll revenue has been collected. By contrast, the first eight DBFO road contracts
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involve the use of ‘shadow tolls’ where payments depend on the volume of
traffic (subject to a volume ‘cap’) but are paid by the government, not by service
users. Unlike lane closures resulting from poor maintenance, risks arising from
traffic volumes are largely outside the control of road operators and hence risk
transfer is unlikely to lead to value for money. The National Audit Office (1998)
recently concluded that the ‘use of shadow tolls as the primary means of
payments to operators may have reduced the net savings generated by the
contracts’.
Payment mechanisms based on traffic volumes raise two additional sets of
dangers. First, the winning bid comes from the consortium with the most
optimistic forecast of general traffic growth, not the most efficient. Such a
‘winner’s curse’ may generate considerable pressure for the government to
extend the length of the original concession, effectively returning the demand
risk to the public sector. Second, tender prices may be highly sensitive to policy
decisions by the public sector over the availability of competing services such as
the withdrawal of the public sector Caledonian MacBrayne ferry service upon
completion of the Skye Bridge and upgrades to roads competing with DBFO
schemes. Whilst contracts that terminate once an agreed present value of tolls
has been collected avoid some of these problems, consideration needs to be
given to providing incentives to avoid delays in construction and ensure
adequate maintenance.
(b) Residual Value Risk
The assets created under PFI deals typically have an expected useful life beyond
the formal contract period.
14 Risks associated with how much the assets will be
worth at the end of the service contract will have an important influence on the
value of initial bids and the incentives facing contractors. The (now defunct)
Private Finance Panel (1996) argued that ‘there is no need for the public sector
to concern itself with the residual value of an asset in a carefully structured PFI
contract’. Whether such an approach is desirable depends on whether the
residual value of an asset is largely subject to decisions taken by the contractor,
as occurs when competitive markets already exist for the supply of assets, or
may reasonably be expected to develop in the future. In office accommodation
contracts (see HM Treasury (1996b)), for example, competitive markets already
exist and private contractors can control some of the risks associated with
residual value, such as maintaining the accommodation to a good standard.
Many PFI contracts involve highly specific assets for which competitive
markets are unlikely to develop and where contract renewal will largely depend
on decisions by public sector managers. This may lead private contractors,
fearful of the residual value of assets being close to zero, to attempt to recover
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their full costs over the service contract and yet retain ownership of the assets.
Where contracts involve significant investments in relationship-specific capital,
contracts that rely on repeated bargaining at a later date are likely to be
unattractive (Joskow, 1987). This is a familiar issue in the literature on
franchising in the presence of specific capital assets (Williamson, 1976). The
general result is that this degree of uncertainty over the residual value of the
asset at the end of a contract whose length is shorter than the expected useful life
of the asset leads to private firms being less willing to invest in such capital
assets or demanding a higher price for doing so.
In some PFI deals, such as the DCMF prison contracts, residual value risk has
been largely retained by the public sector, which takes ownership of the prisons
at the end of the formal service contract, with the assets maintained to pre-
arranged quality standards.
15 This seems sensible since difficulties associated
with obtaining planning permission for new prisons may render the supply of
such assets relatively inelastic, even in the longer run. Private operators can be
expected to recover the full value of their investment during the 30-year contract
period.
PFI deals where ownership of the underlying assets remains in private hands
at the end of the PFI service contract are of more concern. In the Northern Line
trains contract, the expected train life of 36 years exceeds the initial service
contract length of 20 years. Whilst such contracts may give private operators
incentives for adequate maintenance in order to improve their prospects for
extending the original contract, reversion to public ownership at a fixed quality
standard would provide similar incentives. Indeed, a second auction for the
operation of the trains after 20 years could plausibly yield lower costs than
negotiation with a single asset-owner in a quasi-monopoly position vis-à-vis the
public sector. The transfer of residual value risk may, however, be appropriate
for Information Technology contracts, where the speed of technological progress
makes contracting future quality standards very difficult and private management
of system upgrades may have a significant bearing on contract renewal and
hence residual value.
(c) Risk Transfer More Apparent than Real
Value for money in PFI deals will clearly be compromised if the public sector
ends up bearing risks that have supposedly been transferred to the private sector.
The National Audit Office study (1997c) of the Bridgend and Fazakerley prison
contracts, recognising such concerns, recommended that future contracts should
unambiguously reflect the department’s understanding of how the risks are to be
allocated between the signatories. Most of the risk transfer in PFI contracts
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signed to date does, however, appear to have been real. PFI deals are contracts
for the delivery of a public service at an agreed price, not for the supply of an
asset. As a result, PFI service contracts typically specify payment mechanisms
that are not triggered until service delivery commences, that are not responsive
to realised construction or maintenance costs and that apply financial penalties
for delivery failure. Payments in the first two prison contracts depend on the
availability of both cells and complementary inputs such as staffing, food and
health-care services. Controllable risks, such as non-availability of cells due to
inmate damage, will also result in penalties (HM Prison Service, 1996).
Similarly, payments to the contractor for the NIRS2 contract will not commence
until the system is operating satisfactorily, and £3.1 million of the £3.8 million
additional costs incurred through unforeseen delays are to be borne by the
private sector (National Audit Office, 1997b).
Whilst a clear allocation of risk in PFI contracts should minimise such
concerns, this may be imperilled if private operators get into financial
difficulties.
16 In cases of default, the government can contract for ‘step-in’ rights
to take over the service and can cap its liability. In the first two prison contracts,
for example, the public sector’s liability is the minimum of outstanding
borrowings
17 or the net present value of the unexpired part of the service
contract. Whilst the risks of default could be fully transferred to the private
sector if adequate insurance were available, this is unlikely to be cost-effective.
In the Bridgend and Fazakerley prison contracts, for example, the government
agreed to act as ‘insurer of last resort’, effectively transferring the risk back to
the public sector.
The greatest potential risks for the public sector may occur where a contractor
goes bankrupt before the construction of the infrastructure is complete. This risk
will typically be minimal unless the cost of rectifying the problem that caused
default exceeds the value of the work undertaken. In cases where this is likely, it
may be necessary to write contracts that include the posting of performance
bonds that can be released once certain milestones in the construction process
are passed, as in the DBFO road contracts. The problem is far more worrying
where the government has already made a capital contribution as part of a
public–private partnership, such as the Docklands Light Railway extension or
Channel Tunnel Rail Link. Even if the government is willing to contemplate the
bankruptcy of a high-profile project, it may be unable to recover the value of its
original contribution, even though the level of compensation payable to the
defaulting contractors may be zero. In addition, projects involving infrastructure
required as part of a network will have to be re-tendered, effectively transferring
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the realised construction risk back to the public sector. In practice, the
government might be tempted to alleviate pressure on private consortia by
agreeing to additional public contributions, as demanded by the contractors for
the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, or to extending the term of the concession on the
asset, as occurred in the case of the Channel Tunnel. Both of these represent
hidden subsidies and should be borne in mind when assessing the efficiency of
the PFI. Similar demands have arisen in many other countries (Engel, Fischer
and Galetovic, 1997).
4. Initial Evidence
An accurate assessment of the cost savings that have been realised through the
use of PFI deals is difficult, both because a public sector comparator was not
made in many cases and because those that were used can be highly sensitive to
the assumptions on which they are based. Indeed, the practice of cutting public
sector spending in anticipation of PFI deals going ahead led to some criticism
that the initial tranche of PFI contracts would represent ‘best available value’
(since public sector alternatives may not be available, even if better value) rather
than ‘best value’ since public sector managers may have faced considerable
pressure to go ahead with PFI projects as the only practical method of
proceeding (Treasury Select Committee, 1996; Heald and Geaughan, 1997).
The initial evidence from the first tranche of DBFO road schemes suggests
that, whilst significant cost savings have been achieved overall, estimated
savings vary considerably between different projects and according to the
assumptions on which the estimates are based. The Highways Agency case study
(1997) of the contracts claimed total quantifiable financial savings of £168
million compared with previous public sector procurement, using the 8 per cent
discount rate applied by the Treasury to publicly financed road and rail projects.
When the National Audit Office (1998) used a 6 per cent discount rate, which
gives more weighting to future payments, this saving was reduced to £100
million. In addition, the second study suggested two of the four projects would
have provided better value for money under traditional procurement methods.
Whilst the two DCMF prison contracts at Bridgend and Fazakerley generated
estimated total savings of 10 per cent compared with prisons that were publicly
financed and had operations contracted out to the private sector, all of these
savings came from Bridgend. Fazakerley cost roughly the same as the public
sector comparator (National Audit Office, 1997c). By contrast, the NIRS2
contract cost an estimated 60 per cent less than an equivalent public sector
development (HM Treasury, 1997).
It may well be that estimates of the cost savings achieved in the first batch of
privately financed projects are not particularly informative as to the cost savings
that can be achieved as the initiative develops, especially when departments have
had objectives additional to simply achieving value for money from their firstPrivate Opportunity, Public Benefit?
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few PFI contracts. The first tranche of road contracts were partially driven by the
Highways Agency’s interests in examining how PFI would work for different
types of contract and in developing a competitive road-operating industry. In
other cases, experiences gained in writing the first PFI contracts may lead to
significant additional savings in future contracts. The Lowdham Grange prison
contract was signed more quickly and at a lower cost than the first two prison
contracts.
18 Estimates of cost savings on the basis of contracts already signed
may not, of course, prove to be reliable indicators of whether these contracts turn
out to be good value for money in the longer term.
V. IMPACT OF PRIVATE CONTRACTS ON PUBLIC OBJECTIVES
Whilst the initial evidence on value for money from the use of private finance
provides some grounds for optimism, doubts exist over the welfare effects of
allowing ‘PFIability’ to determine which projects go ahead and whether long-
term contractual commitments will reduce the flexibility with which the public
sector can respond to changing circumstances.
1. Project Mix
Ideally, to maximise social welfare, both the public sector overall and individual
departments would prioritise projects according to a strict cost–benefit analysis
of the relative merits of each competing demand on the public purse — those
projects offering the highest expected social returns would go ahead. If private
finance partially substitutes for public finance, however, the PFIability of
projects may have a crucial influence on the composition of publicly sponsored
investment. Heald (1997) reports that a public sector alternative to the Skye
Bridge would not have gone ahead for at least 20 years. However, maximising
social welfare would suggest that projects should be given the same priority,
however they are financed. Otherwise, the bridge has replaced an alternative
project, which presumably generated higher expected social returns when the
public sector’s priorities were drawn up.
The projects with the highest PFIability are typically those where the quantity
and quality of outputs can be accurately measured (so real or shadow revenue
streams can be used as a payment mechanism), that have the lowest element of
risk and complexity and that are sufficiently large (or can be bundled together
with similar projects). These characteristics are common amongst many transport
projects, which might explain why these projects accounted for 71 per cent by
value of the PFI contracts signed by October 1997.
19 These typically either
produce marketable services that can be financed largely through user charges or
                                                                                                                                   
18The contract was 21 per cent cheaper than Bridgend and 36 per cent cheaper than Fazakerley.
19Source: HM Treasury, 1997.Fiscal Studies
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have easily measurable outputs such as traffic volumes. Even for specific
projects such as hospital developments, PFIability concerns may lead to a bias in
favour of rebuilding over refurbishment. This raises a danger that projects may
be given the go-ahead because of the practicality of the payment mechanism, and
tolling schemes may be chosen even if other methods of finance would yield
greater social or environmental benefits.
20
It is probably too early to draw any long-run conclusions as to the impact of
the PFI on the mix of projects commissioned by the public sector. If cuts to
public budgets in the early years of the initiative were primarily used to put
pressure on public sector managers to give serious consideration to the use of
private finance, a temporary imbalance in the composition of the overall publicly
sponsored capital programme is inevitable, with few longer-term consequences.
In some cases, the early bias towards transport projects may simply reflect
short-run delays in other departments due to greater complexity, the testing of
alternative models and the need for legislative reform. The Highways Agency
chose the first four roads contracts to experiment with different types of scheme
rather than to take forward its top-priority projects. Recent legislative reforms,
such as the NHS (Capital Finance) Act and the Local Government (Contracts)
Bill, which have clarified the powers of NHS trusts and local authorities, have
helped to remove obstacles to many health and education projects. Once such
initial delays are overcome, however, it would be regrettable if recourse to
private finance resulted in PFIability considerations supplementing net social
benefits as the principal criteria driving social investment decisions.
2. Impact on Public Sector Flexibility
PFI service contracts typically span 20 or 30 years to allow private contractors to
recover their capital costs over a reasonable period, raising concerns that the
public sector may end up contractually committed to paying for a service it no
longer requires or can obtain more cheaply elsewhere. This inflexibility could
result in a significant loss in operational efficiency. In practice, such dangers can
be exaggerated, in so far as there is a resource cost to ceasing to use or under-
utilising publicly owned assets, despite cash-based public accounting effectively
treating the use of assets as having zero cost once constructed.
The cost to the public sector of terminating a PFI contract is likely to depend
on how competitive the market for the service provided is. Contracts that share
demand risk either continuously or through ‘break clauses’ at pre-specified dates
may provide good value for money where private contractors can manage what is
                                                                                                                                   
20Heald (1997) quotes Department of Transport figures to suggest that the discounted benefits of an untolled
public sector Birmingham Northern Relief Road would be considerably larger than the PFI tolled project that
has gone ahead.Private Opportunity, Public Benefit?
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effectively a residual value risk at an uncertain future date by supplying the
service to alternative customers. Contract flexibility has been built into the
Longbenton DSS office accommodation contract via sharing demand risk in this
way.
The costs to the public sector of terminating a contract, either because the
service is no longer required or because a lower level of provision is desired, are
likely to be considerably higher in the case of specific assets. In such cases, risk-
averse contractors may be inclined to try to recover their costs before the date at
which a break clause can be activated, rather than over the whole lifetime of the
contract. Some PFI deals, such as the Bridgend and Fazakerley prison contracts,
effectively allow the public sector to ‘buy out’ the private provider at certain pre-
specified dates during the contract. After five years, the prison may step in and
terminate the contract voluntarily by paying the consortium its outstanding debt
plus fair market value for its equity. In any case, the public sector’s maximum
liability for a service it no longer requires is capped at the remaining value of the
contract, which leaves open the possibility of renegotiations, especially over
contractual commitments for complementary inputs. It is not obvious that this
leaves the public sector with less flexibility than if it had obtained the assets
through traditional public procurement.
At present, the risks associated with reducing the flexibility of the overall
£300 billion public expenditure programme appear negligible, largely because of
the relatively small scale of PFI activity that has happened to date. Estimated
payments under PFI contracts in 1998–99 total £1.03 billion, representing only
0.3 per cent of general government expenditure (HM Treasury, 1998). On the
basis of PFI contracts signed to date, annual commitments will peak at about £3
billion around the year 2010. Obviously, the potential dangers of reduced
flexibility will be greater for departments such as Transport where the most
substantial PFI commitments exist, representing over 8.5 per cent of the
department’s annual budget by 2000–01.
21
VI. CONCLUSION
I have assessed the Private Finance Initiative against three criteria — whether it
will release resources for additional investment in social infrastructure, whether
it will provide value for money for the taxpayer and whether the use of private
finance will reduce the public sector’s flexibility to pursue its public service
objectives.
                                                                                                                                   
21John Watts, Minister of State, in evidence to the Treasury Select Committee, 11 July 1996.Fiscal Studies
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The PFI has been accompanied by more-than-offsetting cuts in publicly
financed investment. It is likely that these cuts were partly to put pressures on
departments to examine PFI options and establish a new PFI culture. They also
partly reflect the delays sometimes imposed by the development of new
procedures. It is also possible that the cuts in publicly financed investment would
have been substantial even in the absence of the PFI. However, it appears that, so
far, the PFI has been a substitute for rather than a complement to publicly
financed investment.
Assessments of value for money from individual PFI projects are highly
sensitive to the assumptions made about the cost of the public sector comparator.
The evidence suggests that the out-turns have been variable but that some PFI
contracts have delivered good value.
The effects of the PFI on the public sector’s flexibility to pursue its social
objectives have yet to be established. The PFI tends to distort priorities in favour
of PFIable projects, and can discourage activities that would prejudice the
commercial interests of the PFI sponsor. On the other hand, the PFI may help the
development of competitive markets which should enhance flexibility.
The gains realised through the PFI may increase with time as public sector
managers gain experience in how risks and responsibilities can be optimally
shared between the public and private sectors in a cost-effective manner.
Competitive markets in the provision of many public services may also develop,
significantly reducing the residual value risk associated with some PFI contracts,
and reforms to overcome initial problems in sectors such as the NHS and local
authorities may lead to a better-balanced mix of projects.
Overall, the initial empirical evidence that has emerged suggests that the PFI
has the potential to increase the efficiency with which public services are
delivered in the UK but that it cannot be taken for granted that private finance
will represent good value for taxpayers’ money in every type of capital project.
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